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MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES:
*
THE VIEW FROM RURAL SENDING COMMUNITIES
INTRODUCTION
In this monograph we report some of the preliminary findings of
a study of the causes and consequences of out-migration from rural
communities in Mexico, which has been in progress for 15 months. Our
findings are necessarily tentative since a final, seven-month phase of
the research is still to be completed, including a large-scale sample
survey. The data for this paper have been drawn from in-depth, unstructured
interviews with nearly 80 residents of the communities under study, a com-
plete population census of 2,960 households living in the research
communities (completed in January 1976), local birth and death records
examined in the research communities, participant-observation, and archival
research in Mexican and U.S. government documents. The in-depth interviews
have been conducted with migrants recently returned from the United States,
the wives of other migrants working in the U.S. at the time of the field
work, and with local community leaders, merchants, priests, doctors, and
teachers.
*
This monograph is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented
at the Conference on "Mexico and the United States: The Next Ten Years,"
School of International Service, The American University, Washington,
D.C., March 18-19, 1976. The authors wish to express their appreciation
for comments received from participants in the Conference, especially
Jorge Bustamante and David North, and from Ann L. Craig. The research
reported here has been supported by the International Program for
Population Analysis, Smithsonian Institution, and the Center for
Population Research, National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development. Responsibility for the facts and interpretations presented
in this monograph rests solely with the authors.
-1-
-2-
The research is being done in nine small communities, ranging in
size from 490 inhabitants to about 4,500, dispersed through the region of
Los Altos in the state of Jalisco. The communities were selected so as to
maximize the variation among them in terms of the kinds of government
policies or programs from which they have benefited, the kinds of land
tenure systems which predominate in them, and rates of out-migration during
the past 35 years. The Los Altos region was selected as the site for the
project because of the heavy out-migration it has experienced since the
early years of this century and because of its proximity to several
major Mexican cities (Guadalajara, Leon, and Mexico City) which might
serve as potential destinations for migrants leaving the region. The
Los Altos region suffers from most of the economic and social conditions
which have promoted out-migration from rural areas in Mexico generally --
a very high rate of natural population increase, high unemployment and
underemployment, low wage scales, lack of new land for cultivation,
highly variable rainfall and temperature conditions, poor and constantly
eroding soil.
Our research deals with both internal migration from rural to
urban areas in Mexico, and international migration, almost exclusively to
the United States. The original focus of the project was on internal
migration, but we soon discovered that at least 40 percent of the out-
migration from the communities under study was movement to the U.S. rather
than to other localities in Mexico. We estimate that about 70 percent of
this movement to the United States is of an illegal nature, that is,
engaged in by people lacking any visa or other legal entry permit, or by
those using falsified documents. 4
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The first characteristic of migration to the U.S. from the
Los Altos region which must be noted is its persistence over time. This
movement is not simply a post-1940 phenomenon, as is so often assumed.
Temporary migration to the U.S. from this region dates at least from
1884, when the railroad linking Mexico City to El Paso, Texas--and which
passes through the region--was completed. Even before the Revolution of
1910 there were substantial numbers of people from this region working in
the mines of Arizona, Montana, and other western states. The movement
picked up considerably during the 1920s, and it was greatly accelerated
by the so-called "Cristero" rebellion, a major civil insurrection which
devastated the economy of the region during the period from 1927 to 1929.
Petitions for land reform sent to the Mexican government by Alteno peasants
during the 1920s and 1930s sometimes stressed heavy emigration to the
United States as evidence of the desperate economic situation in their
communities. Petitions of the early 1930s stressed the need for land
redistribution to provide economic opportunities for the thousands of
workers who had been driven out of the U.S. by the Great Depression and
the forced repatriation of Mexican laborers carried out during the 1929-
1932 period by the U.S. government.
Recent historical research by other scholars suggests that this
early wave of migration to the U.S., from the late 19th century to 1930,
was an important though generally overlooked feature of rural Mexico
during this period. Of course, the visibility of the phenomenon to U.S.
- 3 -
- 4 -
observers has generally varied according to the state of the U.S. economy,
becoming a highly salient public concern only during periods of economic
downturn and high unemployment.
Table 1
MEXICAN AND OTHER ILLEGAL ALIENS
DEPORTED FROM THE U.S., 1964-19/4
II III IV
Aliens Who
Were Previous-
Deportable Deportable Mexican Deportable Mexican ly Deported as
Aliens Locateda. Aliens Locateda Aliens as % of "I" % of "I"
42,879 35,146 81.9 30.0
52,422 44,161 84.2 26.6
79,610 71,233 89.4 30.3
94,778 86,845 91.6 29.2
123,519 113,304 91.7 29.6
172,391 159,376 92.4 30.0
231,116 219,254 94.8 29.1
302,517 290,152 95.9 29.8
369,495 355,099 96.1 31.3
498,123 480,588 96.4 30.2
634,777 616,630 97.1 28.7
aSource: U.S. Department of Justice,
Service, Annual Reports, 1973, 1974.
Immigration and Naturalization
Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
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Although the U.S. government statistics shown in Table 1 suggest
a sharp increase in the volume of illegal Mexican migration to the U.S.
in recent years, the pattern for most of our research communities in
Jalisco is one of a gradual, long-term increase, in both legal and
illegal movement to the U.S. Today it is uncommon in most of these
communities to find a family in which at least one family member has not
worked in the U.S. at some point during the preceding two years. Even
most of the local government officials--Presidentes Municipales, delegados,
comisarios ejidales--have a history of legal and illegal migration to the
U.S. There appears to be more movement to the U.S. than ever before, as
population pressure increases, the landless sons of ejidatarios who re-
ceived plots during the agrarian reforms of the 1930s find it impossible
to support their own families on income from their father's plot, and
kinship networks spread farther and farther into the U.S. interior.
WHO MIGRATES?
U.S.-bound migrants from the communities under study are over-
whelmingly male. A few unmarried young women go, mostly to work in
factories, but usually as part of whole families who migrate as a family
group. Most of the male migrants are in the 17-to-45-year age group
(17 to 29 years seems to the prime age group), but among our interviewees
there were also individuals who made their first trip at the age of 12 or
14, as well as a 68-year old man who continues to spend several months
each year working in the fields of California. The vast majority are
single when they migrate to the U.S. for the first time. Married men
usually do not take their wives and children with them, primarily because
of the high cost of maintaining them in the U.S. They find it possible to
save more money, and faster, by leaving family members behind.
Most of the migrants have had at least some formal education,
but have not progressed beyond three of four years of primary school.
Landless agricultural workers--peones, jornaleros--and share-
croppers (medieros) are by far the most migration-prone groups in the
communities under study. They are followed by ejidatarios, or recipients
of land under the agrarian reform, many of whose plots are not large
enough, or of such poor quality, that they cannot provide an adequate
family income. In ejido communities it is the landless sons of ejidatarios
who constitute the most migration-prone group. Small private landholders--
or peguenos propietarios--and small merchants or artisans are the least
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likely to migrate. In this region the private landholders usually have
more land and considerably higher incomes than ejidatarios and landless
workers. They can also afford to buy more livestock--particularly dairy
cattle--which provide a steadier source of income, less dependent upon
adequate rainfall for crop growing.
Those who migrate legally to the U.S. are usually middle-aged men
with above-average family incomes, with long histories of employment in
the U.S. They can afford the expense involved in obtaining legal entry
papers, have had time to develop close relationships with U.S. employers
who can assist them in legalizing their status, or have relatives who
are now established in the U.S. and hold U.S. citizenship and who can also
assist them in obtaining papers. Those who migrate illegally are among
the poorest residents of the community--especially the sons of landless
workers and ejidatarios; but those at the very bottom of the local income
distribution are not likely to migrate to the States because they lack
even the resources needed to cover the costs of transportation and the
fees charged by the coyotes--or professional smugglers of migrant workers--
whose services are needed to get across the border and to a place of
employment.
MIGRATORY PATTERNS
Some residents of the research communities migrate to the U.S.
only when there is severe economic necessity caused by a drought, a crop
failure due to premature frosts, or some other temporary condition which
severely reduces the family income. They are "target" migrants, seeking
only to earn enough to maintain their family until the next harvest, to
pay off a debt, to purchase or replace a bullock needed to cultivate their
land, and so forth.
Others should really be considered "professional" migrant workers,
spending at least six months every year at work in the United States, until
they are too old to go, or until they have improved their economic situation
enough, or until their children have grown up and are self-supporting,
enabling them to maintain an adequate standard of living in their home
community without seasonal employment in the U.S. In these cases migration
to the U.S. becomes an accepted, inevitable feature of family life. Wives
and children simply resign themselves to the temporary absence of the
family head because of the lack of local income-earning opportunities.
When the men return from the U.S., they spend their time tending livestock
or local business interests (if they have them), working at odd jobs,
fixing up their houses, or just "vacationing" with their families.
Although the majority of those whom I have termed "professional"
migrants have obtained legal entry papers, the overwhelming majority of
these men have a history of at least one illegal entry into the U.S.
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Nearly all of the older men also spent at least one period legally in
the U.S. as a contracted laborer, under the so-called "bracero" agree-
ments between the U.S. and Mexican governments during the 1940s and later
from 1950 to 1964. When the last "bracero" agreement was terminated, they
continued to go to the U.S., illegally, at least until they succeeded
in obtaining legal entry papers.
A few of the middle-aged men who now oscillate back and forth
between the U.S. and their home communities in Mexico were themselves born
in the U.S., to parents who were working there during the early waves of
emigration in the 1920s. They were brought back to Mexico as young
children during the Depression or repatriation period, then began re-
turning seasonally to the U.S. in the mid-1950s (legally, of course,
because of their U.S. citizenship by birth). In these and many other
families, several generations have participated in migratory movement
to the U.S. Fathers and sons may now work in the States simultaneously,
although usually for different employers.
From the preceding discussion it should be clear that the bulk
of migration to the U.S. from the communities under study is of a temporary
rather than permanent character. The average length of stay in the U.S.
seems to be about six to eight months, with most of the migrants leaving in
March and returning in early December. The longest period of continuous
employment in the U.S. among our interviewees was nine years, but for most
of the "long-stayers," only two or three consecutive years seems to be the
norm.
MOTIVES FOR MIGRATION
Why do they go? Except for the "professional" migrants who have
more or less "made it" economically, the decision to go to the U.S., at
least initially, seems to be prompted in most cases by sheer economic
necessity, rather than a desire to accumulate capital. The flow seems
to be most sensitive, over time, to fluctuations in rainfall. In those
communities almost totally dependent on agriculture, severe drought or
rains which arrive too late for the crop-raising cycle seem to produce
massive emigration to the U.S. Even in climatically good years, however,
poor soil, erosion, low wages for landless workers, the high cost or
unavailability of chemical fertilizers, the lack of credit, and the lack
of employment opportunities for those entering the labor force combine
to produce high rates of emigration.
An excess of population, relative to the amount of cultivable land
and the numberof non-agricultural employment opportunities, seems to be
one of the most basic factors promoting out-migration from the communities
under study. The average completed family in these communities has about
eight children. Mortality rates have fallen sharply since 1940, due to
improved health care and sanitation, and fertility rates remain quite
high. The majority of families practice no form of birth control, due in
part to low education, in part to low incomes, and in part to the pervasive
influence of the Catholic Church.
It must be emphasized, however, that even if population growth
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were somehow to be brought into equilibrium with employment opportunities
in communities such as this, emigration to the U.S. would undoubtedly
continue, as long as the wage differential for unskilled or low-skilled
jobs between the U.S. and rural Mexico remains as large as it is today.
The bulk of the population in the communities under study is landless;
and wages for landless workers in these communities average between 25
and 30 pesos per day (or $2 to $2.80 per day). By contrast, those who
have worked recently in agricultural jobs in the United States report
receiving between $2.50 and $3.00 per hour; and those who held factory
jobs have received between $4 and $5 per hour in recent years. Some of
them hold two jobs simultaneously while they are in the U.S., working
16-hour days and earning $60 to $65 per day. The rule of thumb is that
residents of the research communities can earn and save more in one to
three months of work in the U.S. than they could in an entire year of
labor in their home community.
We believe that much more about this phenomenon can be understood
by taking as our point of departure the rational individual who attempts
to maximize utility (wealth, prestige, security) through migration. For
most residents of the communities under study the decision to go to the
U.S. is an eminently rational one, in terms of differential economic
returns to one's labor, as well as the high probability of finding a job
in the U.S. While some of those who migrate may feel that they are being
exploited by U.S. employers and a source of cheap labor, they are just as
likely to feel that by emigrating they are escaping even more egregious
exploitation by the local cacique (political boss) or wealthy landowners
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in their home community, who pay starvation wages for even longer hours
of labor, under even poorer conditions, than most low-status jobs to be
had in the U.S.
For many peasants, migration to the U.S. is also highly rational
in terms of reducing economic risk, even if one must enter illegally.
The peasant often estimates that the risk of not finding a job, or of
being caught and deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), is substantially lower than the risk of having an inadequate income
if he stayed in his home community, due to the uncertainties of rainfall
and temperature, fluctuations in the market prices for what he produces,
the frequent unavailability of fertilizer and other necessary inputs to
agricultural production, and many other factors. Under these circumstances,
the peasant's migratory behavior can be conceived as a rational process of
risk reduction rather than risk taking.
While economic rationality helps to explain a great deal of the
movement to the U.S., there are clearly other factors which contribute to
the extremely high volume of emigration from some communities, and within
certain age-groups. For example, unmarried young men may migrate at least
in part to temporarily escape parental authority, or to demonstrate
their "machismo," or to save enough to be able to marry and form their
own home. Local community tradition or norm structure may also play a
major part. In several of the communities under study, a structure of
attitudinal and behavioral norms has developed which is strongly supportive
of migration to the U.S. It is an accepted, highly institutionalized
feature of community life. Also, in these and all the other communities
under study, there is little or no social stigma attached to illegal
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migration to the States. If one is caught and deported by the INS, it
is viewed simply as "bad luck." On the other hand, one who successfully
evades the INS, especially after multiple sojourns in the States,
increases his status among his peers.
WHERE DO MIGRANTS GO, AND WHY?
As indicated by the data reported in Table 2, the most favored
destinations for those migrating to the U.S. are in California (especially
the southern portion of the state), the Chicago area, and the state of
Texas. Texas is less desirable than California for those who seek agricul-
tural jobs, because of the lower wage structure which prevails there.
Those with papers and more economic resources to cover transportation costs
tend to seek better-paying jobs in the industrial, construction, or ser-
vice sectors of northern cities such as Chicago and Detroit. For those
migrating illegally and without enough resources to support themselves
during a prolonged period of job seeking, California offers the best pos-
sibilities because agricultural jobs are plentiful there and are less time
consuming to obtain. The poorest migrants without papers tend to prefer
jobs located in small towns or rural areas, because of the lower living
costs there. This pattern is illustrated by the data in Table 3, on place
of residence in the U.S. of migrants from one of the nine communities
included in our study. Emigrants from this community were working in at
least 110 different U.S. localities dispersed through 19 different states,
as of July 1975. Most of these localities are outside major metro-
politan areas.
- 14 -
- 15 -
Table 2
U.S. DESTINATIONS OF MIGRANTS FROM NINE RURAL COMMUNITIES
IN JALISCO, WHO LEFT BETWEEN JANUARY 1975 AND JANUARY 1 9 76a
Locality Number of Migrants
California
(Total:
Illinois
(Total:
Texas
(Total:
Oklahoma
(Total:
Florida
(Total:
Other U.S.
(Total:
104)
Los Angeles
Santa Ana
Others
Chicago
Others
Dallas
San Antonio
Others
23)
20)
(various)
3)
2)
States
15)
(unspecified)
(various)
TOTAL: 167
Source: Authors' complete population census of nine research
communities in Los Altos de Jalisco, January 1976. The figures
reported here should be taken primarily as indicators of pre-
ferred destinations within the U.S.--not of the absolute number
of migrants to the U.S. during the January 1975-January 1976
period. The census question asked only about members of the
household not living at home at the time of the census who had
been living at home in January 1975. Since the majority of
temporary migrants to the U.S. usually return to their home
community during the months of December and January, they would
not be included in responses to the census question. Thus the
total number of migrants to the U.S. during the specified time
period is likely to be considerably higher than these figures
indicate. The proportion of permanent migrants to the U.S. who
left during this period cannot be discerned from the census data.
The data reveal that more than 37 percent of vmigrants from the
research communities leaving between January 1975 and January
1976 went to the United States rather than cities or other
localities within Mexico.
State
50
6
48
15
8
3
2
15
3
2
15
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Table 3
U.S. DESTINATIONS OF MIGRANTS FROM "LA UNION," JALISCO,
WORKING IN THE U.S. AS OF JULY 31, 1975, BY STATE AND LOCALITYa
State
Arizona
(Total: 7)
California
Total: 149)
Locality
Hayden
Kearny
San Luis
Wellton
Los Angeles
Santa Ana
Norwalk
Union City
Hickman
Huntington Park
Long Beach
San Jose
Compton
Denair
Huntington Beach
Livingston
Marysville
Merced
Oakdale
Orland
Selma
Venice
Acampo
Bakersfield
Kerman
Rocklin
Snelling
Watsonville
Westminster
Whittier
Alhambra
Anaheim
Artois
Azusa
Berkeley
Chino
Dinuba
El Centro
El Monte
Freedom
Fresno
Hayward (Castro Valle
Heber
Number of Migrants
1
3
1
2
22
15
8
8
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
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Table 3, continued
Locality Number of Migrants
(California,
continued)
Colorado
(Total:
Florida
(Total:
Illinois
(Total:
Michigan
(Total:
Montana
(Total:
Nebraska
(Total:
Nevada
(Total:
New Jersey
(Total:
Indio
King City
Lamont
Madera
Manteca
Montebello
Newbury Park
Oakland
Orange
Paramount
Sacramento
Santa Paula
Solana Beach
Soledad
South Gage
Vacaville
Yuba City
Other localities
Pueblo
Denver (Lakewood)
Norwood
Daytona (Allendale)
23)
2)
31)
Chicago
Elgin
Harvey
Joliet
Onarga
Detroit
Ferndale6)
1)
3)
Sidney
Nebraska City
Omaha
Wood River
North Las Vegas
Tonopah
Atlantic City
Clementon
2)
3)
State
19
3
1
2
23
2
2
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
- 18 -
Table 3, continued
State
New Mexico
(Total:
New York
(Total:
Ohio
(Total:
Oklahoma
(Total:
Oregon
(Total:
Locality
Anthony
Germantown
Pine Bush
3)
4)
2)
1)
1)
Pennsylvania
(Total: 1)
Texas
(Total: 43)
Washington
(Total: 1)
Wisconsin
(Total: 2)
Toledo
Madill
Princeville
McDonald
Dallas
Fort Worth
San Antonio
El Paso
Corpus Christi
Skidmore
Water Valley
Houston
Levelland
Lubbock
Mission
Ysleta
Seattle
Milwaukee
Racine
Number of Migrants
3
2
2
2
15
9
5
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
SUMMARY
States with largest number of migrants:
California 149
Texas 43
Illinois 31
Colorado 23
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Table 3, continued
Cities with largest numbers of migrants:
Chicago, Ill. 23
Los Angeles, Calif. 22
Pueblo, Col. 19
Dallas, Texas 15
Santa Ana, Calif. 15
Total number of U.S. states represented: 19
Total number of U.S. localities represented: 110
Total number of migrants working in U.S.: 285
Source: Address files maintained by the local priest. Data collected
on July 31, 1975. Total estimated population of the community on that
date: 3,100.
We asked our informants in the research communities why they chose
to migrate to the United States instead of Mexico City, Guadalajara, Leon,
or some other major city within Mexico. The responses were quite consis-
tent: Lower wage scales and greater difficulty in finding work make
Mexican cities less attractive as destinations. Of course, one must in-
vest more in getting to a place of employment in the U.S., and must run
the risk of arrest and deportation if he goes without papers; but he stands
to gain much more. It was often pointed out by our informants that those
who migrate to Mexico City or Guadalajara may live a little better than
in their home community, but they do not really progress very far. Many
of our informants also complained that Mexico City and most other large
cities within Mexico are terrible places in which to live--they have far
too many people, too many motor vehicles, too much noise, too much pollution,
- 20 -
and the pace of life there is too frantic. In the U.S., superior living
conditions can be had in a small town or even in a suburb of a large
city.
A small proportion of the men residing in the research communities
have migrated temporarily to other rural areas of Mexico (usually in nearby
states such as Aguascalientes), to work in crop harvesting. These jobs
pay so little, however, that they are seldom considered as an alternative
to seasonal labor in the United States.
ILLEGAL ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES
How do they get there? For most residents of the communities under
study, raising the money needed to finance a trip to the U.S. is not a
major problem. They may sell off a few head of cattle or borrow the cash
from relatives or a local money-lender. Those who must go illegally
may purchase falsified birth certificates or legal entry credentials for
about 500 pesos (or $40), and there is heavy traffic in such documents
in these and many other Los Altos communities. Some go to the trouble and
expense of obtaining tourist visas, then overstay their visas in order
to work in the States. Most migrants travel to the border by bus, though
the more affluent migrants with papers sometimes go by plane. Once at
the border, those lacking papers may ford the Rio Grande in Texas (the
traditional "mojados," or wetbacks) or vault the wire fences along the
border in California (those who cross this way are known locally as
"alambres"). Some have even crawled through drain pipes extending across
the border from one city to another.
The majority of those who enter the U.S. illegally make use of
coyotes, the professional smugglers of migrant workers. Coyotes are
easily locatable in bars or even on the streets of most Mexican border
cities. They are also readily available in certain "staging" communities
located well inside Mexico, in northern border states such as Sonora.
The coyote instructs the prospective migrant where to attempt his border
crossing and at what hour. The illegal crosses on foot and is met by the
coyote on the U.S. side. The coyote then transports him in his car or
truck to whatever destination the migrant chooses. The going rate for
- 21 -
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these services at the present time is about $250 to most destinations
within California, and about $400 to northern cities such as Chicago.
The charges are scaled to the distance of the preferred destination from
the border, and the amount of INS surveillance in particular areas at
particular times, although some extra benefits may also increase the
coyote's fee. For example, some coyotes now offer a "package deal"
including assistance in crossing the border, transportation to the place
of employment, a falsified birth certificate and social security card.
Usually, about 3,000-4,000 pesos ($240-$320) are needed to cover the
minimum expenses of an illegal migration, including transportation to
the border and the fees of a coyote. In some cases the coyote's services
are arranged and paid by a U.S. employer. The coyote may send word to
the migrant's home community that a certain number of workers is being
sought by a certain employer, or he may even personally visit the community
to recruit workers.
However contact is made with the illegal migrant, the operations
of coyotes--together with the unscrupulous border-state lawyers who
collect exorbitant fees often over a period of several years from illegals
seeking to "arrange" legal entry or residence papers--represent a multi-
million-dollar-a-year business. This unfortunate "business" is a direct
and inevitable outcome of the present system of legally restricted migra-
tion, which limits immigration to the U.S. from all Latin American
countries combined to 120,000 per year, resulting in waiting periods of
up to two and one-half years for a U.S. visa.
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The illegals whom we have interviewed stress that crossing the
border and evading the INS en route to a place of potential employment
in the U.S. is the easiest part of the migration experience; the only
problem is finding a job. Our interviews make it clear that the INS is
not a very formidable adversary, or deterrent to illegal migration. The
majority of our informants with a history of illegal migration to the
U.S. have never been apprehended by the INS. Even among those who have
entered illegally six or more times, they are unlikely to have been
arrested and deported more than once. As INS Commissioner Leonard Chapman
himself has admitted, "The guy we apprehend has to be very unlucky indeed,"
given the huge number of illegals, the 2,000-mile border to be patrolled,
and the small number of agents employed by the INS. The border is so
porous that some of our informants working illegally in southern Calif-
have found it possible to spend their weekends in Mexican border cities
and return to their U.S. place of employment the following Monday.
If he is caught by the INS far from the border, after a period of
several weeks or months of employment in the U.S., the illegal migrant will
usually return to his home community in Mexico. If, like the majority of
those apprehended by the INS, he is caught soon after crossing the border,
the migrant will usually attempt a new illegal entry, within a day or so
after his initial deportation. In the vast majority of cases, this second
attempt will be successful.
Illegals who are employed in field work run a relatively higher
risk of apprehension by the INS than those employed in factories, res-
taurants, or other urban-based businesses, because they are more visible
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Most migrants--both legal and illegal--seem to find work within a
week or two after crossing the border. Most of the jobs are obtained by
directly approaching potential employers, but in a sizable minority of
cases relatives or friends are used as intermediaries in securing work.
Job-seeking time tends to decline with each successive entry into the U.S.,
and is often reduced to zero among the "professional" migrants who work
each year for the same U.S. employer. This is especially true of migrants
who enter the U.S. legally, using papers obtained with the assistance of
a U.S. employer.
Most of the concern expressed about the influx of illegal migrants
from Mexico by U.S. labor union leaders, government officials, and some
leaders of the Chicano community stems from the alleged impact of the il-
legals on the U.S. labor market. It is argued that illegals tend to be
concentrated in the low-wage, low-skill sector of the labor market, where
they compete directly with disadvantaged native Americans, especially
Blacks and Chicanos.
Our interviews with several residents of the research communities
who had held supervisory jobs in the U.S. suggest that U.S. employers do
prefer to hire illegals to fill certain kinds of less desirable jobs,
particularly in the agricultural sector. The illegal is viewed as attrac-
tive because of his high productivity, dependability, and willingness to
accept dirty, physically punishing tasks, low wages, poor working
conditions, and low job security. However, according to our informants,
these same job characteristics make these jobs unattractive to native
Americans, particularly of the younger generation. At least in the
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agricultural sector, the principal impact of illegal migration seems to
be the depression of wage scales for certain types of unskilled jobs,
rather than the displacement of native Americans from them. Illegal
migrants are not necessarily paid at lower rates than legal workers at
their place of employment--indeed, none of the illegals whom we inter-
viewed claimed that they had been discriminated against in this way.
Rather, wages paid for certain types of jobs (particularly in agriculture)
are uniformly low, at least by U.S. standards. Ironically, the depressant
effect of illegal migration on U.S. wage scales is often cited as a pro-
blem by migrants with papers--most of whom have a personal history of one
or more illegal entries into the U.S.
The supervisory workers whom we interviewed argued that many of the very
low-skill, low-wage agricultural jobs now usually held by Mexican illegals
would be eliminated by employers through mechanization if the supply of
illegal migrant labor were to be cut off. Raising and enforcing minimum
wage levels and improving working conditions for these jobs, to the degree
which would be necessary to attract native American workers, would pro-
bably have the same effect. Even if the jobs survived stiffer regulatory
measures imposed by the U.S. government, it seems likely that the sheer
nature of the work--under the best of conditions--would continue to deter
most native American job seekers.
The evidence from our study does suggest, however, that Mexican
migrants--both legal and illegal--do compete directly with native Americans
for certain types of non-agricultural jobs, particularly in factories and
in the construction industry. But the degree of competition seems to vary
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considerably among job categories, and, for certain kinds of jobs,
Mexican migrants--with their extremely low skill levels, their low level
of formal education, and their lack of facility with the English language--
are severely handicapped in competition with native Americans. Thus the
problem of job competition seems far more complex than most critics of
Mexican migration to the U.S. have been willing to admit. Our research
thus far suggests that blanket accusations to the effect that "illegal
Mexicans are taking jobs away from disadvantaged Americans" need consider-
able qualification. The impact of illegal Mexican migration on job
seeking by native Americans seems to vary significantly from one sector
of the economy to another, and among job categories within sectors.
TAX USERS OR TAX PAYERS?
A second major concern regarding the U.S. impact of Mexican
immigration is the utilization of government-supported services and pro-
grams by the migrant population. Contrary to the beliefs or accusations
of many U.S. government officials and private citizens concerned with
the escalating costs of social welfare programs, migrants from our
research communities seem to make remarkably little use of such programs.
Among the 30 informants who were questioned in detail about their utili-
zation of public services while employed in the U.S., only three reported
that they had ever collected unemployment compensation (when work runs
out, they simply return to Mexico). None had ever received free medical
care, food stamps, or welfare benefits. Only three had had children
enrolled in U.S. schools, and in all of these cases the migrants had
entered the U.S. legally.
On the other hand, nearly all of our migrant informants had paid
U.S. social security taxes, and about half had had personal income taxes
withheld from their wages. Some had paid property and school taxes on
houses owned in the U.S., and all paid state sales taxes where they
applied. Thus all available evidence indicates that these migrants paid
into the U.S. government treasury, in taxes, far more than they collected
in the form of benefits from tax-using programs. Our findings on this
point are corroborated by the results of another major study of illegal
aliens in the U.S., which found that Mexican illegals were considerably
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less likely than illegal aliens from other countries to make use of
tax-supported programs and services. '
1. See David S. North and Marion F. Houstoun, "Illegal Aliens: Their
Characteristics and Role in the U.S. Labor Market," report pre-
pared by Linton & Co., Inc., Washington, D.C., for the Manpower
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Contract No. 20-11-74-21
(December 1975).
IMPACT OF MIGRATION TO THE U.S. ON
MIGRANTS' COMMUNITIES OF ORIGIN
What do Mexican migrants send or bring back to their home
community, and what impact does it have on community life? In most of
the communities under study, cash remittances from migrants working in
the U.S. to their families in the communities are tremendously important,
both to the household economy and to that of the community generally.
The migrants or their wives whom we interviewed reported that they sent
home, on a regular basis, from $100 to $300 per month (the average was
slightly over $200). The funds are sent by mail, usually in the form of
checks or money orders, which may be cashed in local stores or in banks
in nearby towns.
Since there appears to be some disagreement among researchers on
the amount and importance of migrant remittances for the Mexican economy
as a whole, and given the evident importance of such remittances in the
specific communities under study, we have begun the collection of
remittance data from the records of one of Mexico's largest banks, the
Banco Nacional de Mexico, which handles approximately 24 percent of all
banking transactions in Mexico. The data in Table 4, pertaining to a single,
randomly selected day (September 19, 1975), provide a very partial indi-
cation of the magnitude and distribution of migrant remittances, by U.S.
state or origin and destination within Mexico. The average amount
remitted according to the Bank's records for this particular day was
$95.53. Since most of the migrants whom we interviewed reported that
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Table 4
MONEY ORDERS TO SPANISH-SURNAMED RECIPIENTS FROM SENDERS
IN THE U.S., PROCESSED BY THE BANCO NACIONAL DE MEXICO,
MEXICO CITY, ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1 9 7 5a
Branch of Banco Nacional
de Mexico Where Money
Order Was Cashed
LAGOS DE MORENO JALISCO
(Los Altos region)
AGUASCALIENTES
CHIAPAS
DISTRITO FEDERAL
(incl. Mexico City)
DURANGO
GUANAJUATO
U.S. State
of Origin
California
Illinois
Colorado
Florida
Othersc
California
Illinois
Wisconsin
Others
California
California
Illinois
Texas
New York
Colorado
Florida
Connecticut
Washington
Wisconsin
New Mexico
Kansas
Minnesota
Arizona
Ohio
Idaho
Oregon
Indiana
Others
California
Others
California
Illinois
Texas
New York
Colorado
Florida
Total Value of
Money Ordersb
$ 605
1,681
90
10
442
465
50
55
480
325
25,931
7,409
1,977
35
548
180
40
880
133
100
70
100
30
20
580
20
16
21,033
2,299
460
9,583
3,914
775
570
1,127
111
Total No.
of Money
Orders
7
8
1
1
7
9
1
2
8
2
265
72
26
2
13
3
1
6
4
1
3
1
1
1
2
1
1
214
19
5
87
36
11
5
11
2
Average Value of
Money Ordersb
$ 86.42
210.12
90.00
10.00
63.14
51.66
50.00
27.50
60.00
162.50
97.85
102.90
76.03
17.50
42.15
60.00
40.00
147.33
33.25
100.00
23.33
100.00
30.00
20.00
290.00
20.00
16.00
98.29
121.00
92.00
110.15
108.72
68.63
114.00
102.47
55.50
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Table 4, continued
Branch of Banco Nacional
de Mexico Where Money
Order Was Cashed
GUANAJUATO (continued)
GUERRERO
HIDALGO
MICHOACAN
MORELOS
OAXACA
PUEBLA
SAN LUIS POTOSI
TAMAULIPAS
VERACRUZ
U.S. State
of Origin
Ohio
Idaho
Others
California
Illinois
Florida
Texas
Others
California
California
Illinois
Florida
Others
Texas
New York
California
Illinois
New York
Arizona
Others
California
Illinois
Ohio
Others
California
Illinois
Texas
Kansas
Others
California
Illinois
Missouri
Texas
Others
California
Illinois
Ohio
New York
Total Value of
Money Ordersb
1,200
135
2,126
$ 1,200
200
210
250
1,495
290
980
815
50
210
24
15
164
300
80
20
160
525
30
40
81.8
673
1,096
723
155
682
347
1,720
190
390
844
854
155
10
100
Total No.
of Money
Orders
1
2
27
18
2
3
4
14
3
12
8
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
2
1
5
6
11
8
2
10
4
3
1
5
14
9
4
1
5
Average Value of
Money Ordersb
1,200.00
67.50
78.74
$ 66.66
100.00
70.00
62.50
106.78
96.66
81.66
101.87
50.00
105.00
24.00
15.00
164.00
300.00
80.00
20.00
160.00
65.62
15.00
40.00
163.50
112.16
99.63
90-.37
77.50
68.20
86.75
573.33
190.00
78.00
60.28
94.88
38.75
10.00
20.00
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Table 4, continued
Branch of Banco Nacional Total No.
de Mexico Where Money U.S. State Total Value of of Money Average Value of
Order Was Cashed of Origin Money Ordersb Orders Money Ordersb
VERACRUZ (continued) Arizona $ 20 1 $ 20.00
Others 317 8 39.63
ZACATECAS California 2,530 34 74.41
Illinois 675 9 75.00
Colorado 60 3 20.00
New York 50 2 25.00
Wisconsin 100 1 100.00
Texas 145 2 72.50
Others 1,383 15 92.50
SUMMARY
Branch Where Cashed Total Value Total Number Average Value
Lagos de Moreno $ 2,828 24 $117.83
Aguascalientes 1,050 20 52.50
Chiapas 325 2 162.50
Distrito Federal 59,107 617 95.79
Durango 2,759 24 114.95
Guanajuato 19,541 182 107.36
Guerrero 3,355 41 81.82
Hidalgo 290 3 96.66
Michoacan 2,055 23 89.34
Morelos 39 2 19.50
Oaxaca 724 5 144.80
Puebla 1,413 16 88.31
San Luis Potosi 3,329 37 89.97
Tamaulipas 3,491 27 129.29
Veracruz 1,456 28 52.00
Zacatecas 4,943 66 74.89
TOTAL $106,704 1,117 $ 95.53
aDate randomly selected using a table of random numbers. Data collection for
other days included in the sample is still in progress. Numerous states having
branches of the Banco Nacional de Mexico are not represented in the data pre-
sented here, since money orders cashed at these branches are not processed by
the Banco Nacional in Mexico City (e.g., orders cashed at branches in the state
of Jalisco other than the Lagos de Moreno branch are recorded in Guadalajara).
Transactions of the Banco Nacional de Mexico represent only about 24 percent of
the total volume of bank transactions in Mexico. The data reported in this
table were gathered in the Department of Foreign Exchange, Banco Nacional de
bMexico, Mexico City.
In U.S. dollars.
cIncludes money orders whose U.S. state of origin could not be determined from
microfilmed records.
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they remitted funds to their families at least twice per month, the
monthly average suggested by the national-level data corresponds quite
closely with the remittance totals reported by our informants (averaging
about $200 per month).
The Banco Nacional de Mexico data show that migrants working in
the states of California, Illinois, and Texas were the principal sources
of the remittances. This distribution corresponds with our interview
data on migrants' destinations within the U.S. It is interesting that
the beneficiaries of remittances processed by the Banco Nacional were
located not only in "high poverty" Mexican states such as Zacatecas and
Michoacan, but in the Federal District (including Mexico City) as well.
This finding may reflect the large number of Federal District residents
who have relatives permanently established in the United States; but it
also raises the possibility that temporary migration to the U.S. does
not necessarily cease once peasants have moved to Mexico City to make
their homes. 2
Apart from the money which is remitted periodically by migrants
while they are working in the U.S., most migrants are able to save and
bring back with them sums ranging from $50 up to $4,000. The average lump
sum with which migrants from the research communities return is somewhere
between $250 and $350. Clearly, most of their earnings are either
remitted to relatives while the migrants are still in the U.S. or spent
2. Among 678 low-income migrants residing in Mexico City interviewed by
Cornelius in 1970, more than 20 percent reported that they had spent
time living in the United States, usually for periods of six months to
two years, and in 92 percent of the cases for purposes of employment.
The interview data from Mexico City are reported fully in Wayne A.
Cornelius, Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City (Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1975).
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in the U.S., on food, housing, clothes and entertainment. The amount
that migrants have been able to remit seems to have declined in recent
years, due to inflated living costs in the U.S. But even under these
conditions, the remittances are of crucial importance to the maintenance
of the migrants' families in their home communities.
Young, single migrants seem to remit substantially less than older
men, and they also tend to spend more on consumer goods such as clothing,
stereo sets, and cars, as well as on alcohol and gambling. A sizable
minority of migrants of all ages seem to squander most of their earnings
from the U.S. on non-essential consumer goods and entertainment. However,
the majority manage to make at least some kind of investment in producer
goods or real estate once they have returned. Perhaps the most frequent
investment is in land, either for cultivation or a lot for building a
house. Others have invested in livestock, house construction or improve-
ments, pick-up trucks, tractors, irrigation pumps, education and health
care for members of their family, or furniture for their homes. Those
who are most successful in the U.S. often attempt to start a small business
in their home community, and may even take their families on vacations to
Acapulco and Mexico City.
The consequences of migrant investments in small businesses can
sometimes be rather dramatic. Prior to 1967, one of the nine communities
included in our study was so economically depressed that it was losing
large numbers of inhabitants through permanent emigration, and most of
those who remained were dependent on income earned in the U.S. Since
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1970, however, the community has more than doubled in population, is
attracting migrants from surrounding villages and towns, and is
experiencing the greatest economic boom in its 137-year history. There
is, in fact, a significant labor shortage in the community. What
happened? In 1967 an individual who had spent nine years working in
the U.S., most of them as a foreman in a rubber factory in Los Angeles,
used the $1,600 he had saved to purchase two small, manually operated
cloth-weaving machines. With them he established a small factory in
his home, turning out women's and children's clothing for sale in nearby
cities and in Mexico City. The business turned out to be profitable,
and his neighbors took note. Today the community has about 180 small
clothing factories, all cottage industry--family-owned enterprises
located in private houses--and is a major supplier of clothing to depart-
ment stores in Mexico City, Monterrey, and many other cities. Primitive,
manual machines have been replaced in some of the factories by highly
sophisticated, motorized machinery imported from Italy, Germany, Japan,
and the U.S. Virtually all of this machinery, from the beginning up to
the present time, has been purchased with earnings from the United States.
Today, those who continue to work seasonally in the U.S. are generally
middle-aged men who leave their wives and children behind to operate the
home factories, and work in the U.S. to save money to invest in more
machinery needed to expand their textile production. This is a small
minority of the family heads, however, since most of them are now able to
finance expansion of their businesses through locally generated profits
and credit from private banks. About one-fourth of the total number of
families living in the community now own their own textile factories,
and the rest depend primarily on earnings from jobs in these factories.
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This is the most striking "success story" among the nine
communities under study. In two other communities, most of the savings
from employment in the U.S. seem to have been invested in durable con-
sumer goods (passenger cars, household appliances, and so forth) rather
than producer goods. In others, the ratio of producer to consumer goods
investment seems to be higher, but not nearly as high as in the case
described above. But in all of the communities under study, local
commerce has benefited substantially from migrant remittances and invest-
ments, and even such non-productive investments as elaborate family or
religious fiestas do their part to keep the local economy afloat.
Some returned migrants from the U.S. have also been responsible
for introducing agricultural innovations, such as the cultivation of
crops like strawberries and carrots, with which they had become familiar
in field work in the U.S. It should be pointed out that, contrary to the
fears or beliefs of some Mexican government officials, emigration to the
U.S. does not seem to depress agricultural production. If the emigrant
owns land, he either leaves other members of the family in charge of
cultivating and harvesting, or rents it out, or enters into a share-
cropping agreement with another resident of his community. Very seldom
does the land actually lay idle during the migrant's absence in the U.S.
Even those who move permanently to the U.S. seem to retain their land-
holdings in their community of origin, and keep them in production using
hired hands, in order to supplement the family income. Thus the migrant
to the U.S. may actually generate income-earning opportunities in his
home community, by delegating agricultural tasks, putting more land into
cultivation, or by establishing non-agricultural small businesses in the
community.
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While it could be argued that decades of migration to the U.S.
have failed to improve in any significant degree the economic conditions
prevailing in many rural "sending" communities in Mexico, it is highly
probable that their economic situation would be considerably worse today,
had heavy migration to the U.S. not occurred. Obviously, some Mexican
communities have benefited from this movement more than others, and some
groups within each community have profited more than others. The internal
distribution of income and land within most of our research communities
is probably as unequal today as it was in the 1930s, but the ability of
the poorest third or half of the population to supplement their incomes
and sometimes expand their landholdings with earnings from the U.S. has
undoubtedly prevented a far more unequal distribution of wealth.
Clearly, "Mexico," or even "rural Mexico," is not the appropriate
unit of analysis in any attempt to assess the costs and benefits of
migration to the United States; a much more differentiated approach is
necessary. And any such cost/benefit analysis, at the community or family
level, must take into account the probable economic situation of the family
unit or the community at large in the absence of migration to the U.S.,
given the limited supply of cultivable land, the slow local rate of job
creation, and the extremely high rate of natural population increase
characteristic of most rural communities in Mexico since 1940. Finally,
to the extent that temporary migration to the U.S. has had the effect of
reducing permanent out-migration from rural communities to Mexico's cities,
it has also reduced the permanent loss of valuable human resources
necessary for the long-term economic development of these communities.
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
It is important to note that returned migrants from the U.S.
have often assumed prominent leadership roles in their communities, some-
times occupying positions as government representatives such as municipal
delegados or comisarios ejidales, sometimes heading committees that pur-
sue community services and other improvements through negotiations with
the government. Moreover, emigrants from the research communities who
are permanently established in the U.S. are often an important source of
cash contributions needed to finance key community improvements such as
electrification and potable water systems. The Mexican government usually
requires the community to be benefited by such improvements to raise a
large proportion of the necessary funds on their own before the projects
are approved, and the U.S. emigrant population, as well as permanent emi-
grants in Mexico City and other large cities within Mexico, have often
provided crucial assistance in raising these "matching" funds.
The demand for education in the communities under study has
also been stimulated somewhat by migration to the U.S. Migrants often
seem to return with a heightened sense of appreciation for the economic
advantages of formal education, and make more strenuous efforts to keep
their children in school so that, according to them, the next generation
will not have to make the kinds of sacrifices, or work at the kinds of
degrading, physically debilitating jobs that their fathers have had to
pursue in the U.S.
The impact of migration to the U.S. on these communities has not
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been completely positive, however. Social dislocations have
occurred; some migrants have abandoned their wives and children to form
new families in the U.S. Some of the younger, single migrants have
reportedly returned with a drug problem. These are the kinds of social
problems most often emphasized by local priests in their discussions of
the migration phenomenon. The priests are hardly unbiased observers,
however, since they find it more difficult to maintain their tradi-
tionally strong control over the local population after several decades
of heavy emigration to the U.S., and they often complain about the
migration as a spiritually as well as morally corrupting experience.
More objective observers in these communities report that cases of
family abandonment, drug abuse, and other social problems resulting
from migration to the U.S. are quite infrequent.
WHY MIGRANTS RETURN TO MEXICO
Much of the debate regarding the impact of Mexican migration on
the U.S. economy and demands for social services in the U.S. turns on the
question of whether Mexican migrants and their families become permanently
established in the U.S., or whether most of them are likely to maintain
a pattern of seasonal or "shuttle" migration. To explore this question
further, we asked each of our migrant interviewees why he had returned to
Mexico at the end of his first period of employment in the U.S. Why did
he not simply remain in the States and form a family there, if single, or
if married, bring his family to live in the U.S.? The factor cited most
frequently in response to such questions was high living costs in the
U.S. Even some migrants whom we interviewed who have become more or less
permanently established in the U.S. told us that they are now planning
to return to Mexico permanently, complaining that even though their wages
are still much higher in their U.S. jobs, they are able to save less and
less due to the spiralling cost of living.
Other aspects of life in the U.S. which are intensely disliked by
the migrants include the severity of the winters, environmental pollution,
racial discrimination, vice and other corrupting influences on the young,
the fast pace of life, and the fact that in the U.S. one must be working
constantly in order to survive--there are no periods of relative inacti-
vity, as there are at several points in the agricultural cycle in Mexico.
Of course, many, if not the majority, of those who migrate to
the U.S. have never seriously considered the possibility of moving there
permanently. Most simply plan to return to Mexico when their jobs
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harvesting agricultural crops are ended, or when they have saved a
certain amount of money, or when cold winter weather arrives. A strike
at the migrant's place of employment in the U.S. may prompt a swift
return to Mexico. Others return because the separation from their families
has become intolerable, or because a child is about to be born, or because
they have become ill, or because some member of their family in Mexico has
become seriously ill. Still others return because they have been given
a leave of absence by their employer in the home community, and would
lose their job in Mexico if they failed to return on schedule. Ejidatarios
must, by law, return after two years, or face the loss of their plot of
land. Differences in social status or prestige are an important concern
for others. One 50-year old informant, who had been born in the United
States and spends six months each year working there, told us:
In the States, I am just another pebble on the beach. Over
here I am Mr. Sanchez. Here, people come to me, in this
little town. I feel like I am living. Over there I don't,
because I am just the Mexican who works with so-and-so.
And after 17 years, that belittles you!
For whatever reason, it is clear that the majority of those who migrate
to the U.S. do not want to stay there permanently. Even those who have
spent many years living in the U.S., improving their economic situation
substantially, hope to return eventually to Mexico, perhaps to start a
small business, buy a ranch, or make some other kind of capital invest-
ment which would enable them to make a comfortable living in their home
community.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
One of our informants, who has worked for many years as a foreman
on a ranch in California, hiring and supervising both legal and illegal
migrants from Mexico, argued strongly that if the U.S. and Mexican govern-
ments were to come to an agreement allowing unrestricted entry of Mexican
migrant workers for a maximum stay of six months each year, at least 75
percent would return to Mexico on schedule. As he put it, "more than
six months of field labor is too much for anybody." His argument is
undoubtedly less applicable to migrants employed in non-agricultural jobs,
but even they seem to have a well-established pattern of temporary
migration.
Such arguments should not, however, be interpreted as endorse-
ment of a new "bracero" agreement modeled on the earlier contract labor
agreements between the U.S. and Mexico. Quite the contrary: All of
the migrants whom we have interviewed expressed their opposition to a new
agreement of this type, which would bind them to a single U.S. employer,
who could alter their pay scale, pay them irregularly, or commit other
abuses at will. They argue that the exploitation of the Mexican worker
was much worse under a system in which the migrant had no opportunity to
switch employers or to determine the duration of his job with a parti-
cular employer. They now earn more, and faster, as illegals than they
did as braceros during the 1950s and early 60s. They do strongly favor
an intergovernmental agreement to legalize entry into the U.S. for
specified periods of employment; this would at least have the effect of
reducing the physical dangers of unassisted illegal border crossings,
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and the exploitation by coyotes and others who profit by the existing
situation. But they strongly oppose any restrictions on their movements
or their opportunities to switch employers once inside the U.S. In
other words, what they seek is free market competition among U.S.
employers seeking their services.
From what we have learned thus far about illegal migration to the
U.S. from our research communities, it would appear that nearly any kind
of restrictive legislation which might be enacted by the U.S. Congress
would have only minimal impact on the flow of Mexican illegals--unless it
were accompanied by a huge, and incredibly costly, enforcement mechanism.
The mind boggles at the kind of bureaucratic and policing apparatus which
would be required to meet this task, and the potential threat to civil
liberties for native Americans which such an apparatus might pose.
It is impossible to legislate away the tremendous migratory
pressures at the U.S.-Mexican border, which result from the enormous wage
differentials between the U.S. and Mexico, severe socioeconomic inequali-
ties within Mexico, and the perception of the U.S. by large sectors of the
Mexican poor as a land of relatively accessible economic opportunities.
Under these conditions, even the most draconian police actions might fail
to deter the prospective illegal migrant. It is difficult to over-
estimate the sheer determination of a landless peasant who cannot find
adequately paid work in his home community, whose children are malnourished
and chronically ill, who can see no prospect for significant improvement
of his family's economic situation within the local opportunity structure.
The nature of the migratory phenomenon, and the extreme difficulty of
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containing it, was conveyed to us perhaps most succinctly and eloquently
by one of our informants, who had witnessed a confrontation between an
INS agent and an illegal migrant who had been apprehended for the third
time. The INS agent queried his captive: "What can we do to prevent you
from doing this again?" The illegal responded: "Shoot me!"
Thus, under present and foreseeable circumstances, the Mexican
illegal will continue to enter the United States, probably in ever-
increasing numbers. Serious efforts at short-term control would have to
be focussed on the U.S. demand for migrant labor rather than the Mexican
supply of laborers. Such efforts should properly be concentrated in
those sectors of the U.S. economy in which illegal Mexican migrants and
disadvantaged native Americans are, in fact, in direct competition for
certain types of jobs (predominantly non-agricultural). The levying of
stiff fines against U.S. employers across the board for employing illegal
migrants is probably the least desirable of the policy alternatives
available for limiting demand. At least within the agricultural sector,
such a policy would probably result in further depression of wage scales,
elimination of whatever fringe benefits may have been provided previously
to illegal migrants, and removal of the migrants (and their contributions)
from the Social Security system, as employers "go underground" in their
efforts to avoid government penalties. Improving and better enforcing
existing labor laws (including minimum wages), to make it more expensive
for employers to use illegal migrant labor, would be preferable to
criminalizing the hiring process, both in terms of effectiveness in
reducing demand for migrant labor and of reducing exploitation of those
migrants who are employed.
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The consequences for Mexico of a severe restriction of the flow
of migrants to the U.S.--should this somehow be accomplished--must also
be assessed with great care. The "safety-valve" function of migration to
the U.S. by the most economically disadvantaged sectors of the Mexican
population should not be underestimated. Temporary migration to the U.S.
tends to reduce permanent out-migration from impoverished rural communities
to large cities within Mexico. It enables poor rural families to subsist
in their home community, and even to achieve a certain measure of socio-
economic mobility, without abandoning their rural base. A severe restric-
tion of the flow of migrants to the U.S. would, in our judgment, result in
a quantum-level increase in permanent out-migration to Mexico City,
Guadalajara, Monterrey, and other large cities, as well as a sharp increase
in the frequency of land invasions and localized peasant confrontations
with landowners and government officials in rural areas.
Of course, it could be argued that the long-term solution to the
problem of illegal migration to the U.S. lies in fundamental structural
changes in the Mexican society and economy, and that such changes are
likely to come about only through increasing mass pressure on the government
to implement large-scale redistributive policies. The massive infusion of
funds into many rural communities through migrant remittances from the U.S.
undoubtedly has had the effect of taking pressure off the Mexican govern-
ment to provide rural income-earning opportunities. Should the flow be
cut off, however, the most likely outcome is accelerated migration to
Mexico's largest cities, thereby increasing the already exorbitant social
costs of these massive urban agglomerations, rather than the emergence
- 48 -
of a broadly based, well-organized movement to force structural change
in the countryside.
Much more could be done by the Mexican government to reduce
migratory pressures along the border, at least in the medium-to-long run.
For example, much greater attention could be devoted to programs for the
direct creation of non-agricultural employment opportunities for rural
dwellers. Our research thus far indicates that this might be the single
most effective policy instrument for reducing rural out-migration, both
to the United States and to urban centers within Mexico. From 1971 to
1975 the proportion of Mexican federal government revenues invested in
the rural sector rose from 12 percent to 20 percent. There has also been
a major increase in international assistance for Mexican rural development
projects, especially through the World Bank. However, most resource
allocations to the rural sector remain biased--as they have been for
decades--toward large-scale producers in high-productivity, irrigated
zones. The objectives of this investment strategy have been to (1)
increase agricultural production, and thus eliminate importation of basic
food commodities; and (2) reduce rural unemployment indirectly, by
increasing the demand for labor by large-scale producers. The early
results have not been particularly encouraging: Only in 1975 did gains
in agricultural productivity begin to keep pace with the country's rate of
natural population increase; and the capacity of the rural sector to absorb
surplus labor has not increased appreciably. While the longer-term pro-
ductivity gains will undoubtedly be more impressive, the unemployment and
underemployment picture is likely to remain bleak, so long as large-scale
producers are not compelled to use more labor-intensive technologies.
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Rural unemployment has been alleviated somewhat since 1971 by short-term
public works projects (e.g., labor-intensive, non-mechanized feeder road
construction), but their impact is necessarily temporary. A small rural
industrialization program has been launched, but it is limited to ejidos
and has received a relatively small share of the government's total
investment in "rural development." Finally, efforts might be made to
reduce the current "urban bias" of the Mexican government's population
control (" paternidad responsable") program. Thus far government invest-
ments in this program have been concentrated largely in urban areas rather
than in the countryside, where the problems of low income, low education,
and strong Church influence which impede the adoption of family planning
practices are most severe.
But even if greatly increased Mexican government resources are
invested in job creation schemes, decentralized family planning campaigns,
and other programs within the next 10 or 15 years, it seems highly unlikely
that Mexico's rural sector will be able to absorb all the surplus labor.
If so, illegal migration to the United States will undoubtedly persist,
especially as long as wage differentials between the U.S. and Mexico
remain quite large. This outlook suggests the need for continuing efforts
to reach bilateral agreements addressed to both the supply and demand
sides of illegal migration, and providing the most equitable and human solu-
tions consistent with the basic value commitments of both societies.

APPENDIX
A NOTE ON THE "REPRESENTATIVENESS" OF RESEARCH
FINDINGS ON ILLEGAL MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S.
In this monograph we have reported preliminary findings from an
study of residents and emigrants from nine rural communities in the region
of Los Altos, state of Jalisco, Mexico, primarily during the period from
1940 to the present (some of our historical research on the communities
extends back to the mid-19th century). We are acutely aware of the spatial
and temporal limitations of our research and have endeavored to take into
consideration the idiosyncracies of our research sites in interpreting our
findings. We are aware, however, that the findings of a "case study" of
the type we are conducting are always subject to challenge on the grounds
that the communities selected for inclusion in the study are in some way
not representative of the majority of rural communities in Mexico which
serve as points of origin for migrants to the United States. The purpose
of this note is to provide additional background information on our
research sites, to enable the reader to evaluate the representativeness
of our findings and to relate them to the conclusions of previous empirical
studies of illegal migration from Mexico to the United States.
Students of regional differences within Mexico may argue that the
region represented in our study, Los Altos de Jalisco, is distinctive from
other Mexican regions in terms of racial composition, specifically its
higher-than-average proportion of tall, light-skinned, light-eyed people,
resulting from the garrisoning of French and Austrian troops there during
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the Maximilian period. Such physical characteristics might be considered
an advantage in illegal migration to the United States, making it more
likely that Altenos will find employment and be more successful in evading
detection by U.S. authorities. However, the physical characteristics
mentioned above are common in only three or four of the 17 municipios
("counties") comprising the Los Altos region (those located in the southern-
most portion, toward Guadalajara), and they are prevalent in only one of
the nine specific Los Altos communities included in our study. In fact,
the population of the region as a whole, and of the communities under
study, is predominantly mestizo and therefore representative of the bulk
of the Mexican population in terms of racial characteristics. Residents
of one of the nine research communities are of predominantly Indian
ancestry; it also has the highest per-capita rate of temporary migration
to the United States among the nine communities. We have been unable to
detect any significant differences in the rate of success in finding
employment and avoiding deportation from the U.S. among migrants from
this community, as compared with others included in our study. In short,
it is impossible to explain our findings on these and other aspects of
illegal migration to the U.S. by reference to the racial characteristics
of the population under study.
We have noted that migration from the Los Altos region to the
United States is a long-standing phenomenon, dating at least back to the
late 1880s. It might be argued that this long history of migration has
given rise to extensive kinship networks, with many members now established
in the United States, which provide present-day migrants from the region
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with sources of assistance in job seeking in the U.S. which are relatively
less available to migrants from other regions of Mexico, in which migration
to the U.S. is a more recent phenomenon. In fact, we found that about one-
half of our informants lacked a relative or friend who was already
established in the United States at the time of their initial migration
to the U.S. Moreover, recent historical research by other investigators
has shown that labor migration to the U.S. from other regions of the state
of Jalisco, and many other parts of Mexico, also began in the late 19th
century.1 Therefore, all available evidence suggests that the Los Altos
region does not differ significantly from other regions which have served
as major points of origin for migrants to the U.S., in terms of the duration
of the phenomenon.
Our findings with regard to migrants' success in finding jobs in
the U.S., and the amount of money they are able to earn, save, or remit
to their families in Mexico, differ substantially from the findings of
1. See L. Garcia y. Griego, "Los Primeros Pasos al Norte: Mexican
Migration to the United States, 1848-1929," Senior thesis in
History, Princeton University, 1973; Carlos Gil, "Mascota,
Jalisco: Social and Economic Change in a Mexican Municipio,"
Ph.D. dissertation in History, University Microfilms, 1975
(author currently in the Department of History, University
of Washington, Seattle); Arturo Rosales, "Mexican Migration
to the Chicago, Ill., Area, 1900-1930," Ph.D. dissertation
in progress, Department of History, University of Houston.
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several other empirical studies of illegal migration to the U.S. 2
Specifically, these studies have found that half or more of the illegal
migrants interviewed were unable to find a job in the U.S. before they
were arrested and deported, and that even among those who were success-
ful in job seeking, only a small minority succeeded in earning enough to
cover the costs of migration and remit a sufficient amount to maintain
their families in Mexico. By contrast, our informants report a high
rate of success in obtaining jobs in the U.S., and most claim to have
realized a substantial monetary return on their investment in migration
to the U.S. These discrepancies in findings might be attributed to the
"non-representativeness" of our research communities, or of our individual
informants within the communities. We believe, however, that they reflect
primarily certain major differences in research design and the compostion
of the population under study.
2. See "Resultados de Encuesta Realizada por la Comision Inter-
secretarial para el Estudio del Problema de la Emigracion Subrepticia
de Trabajadores Mexicanos a Estados Unidos de America," Mexico, D.F.,
1973; Jorge A. Bustamante, "Mexican Immigration to the United States
in the Context of the Social Relations of Capitalism," unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1974, and by the same
author, "Espaldas mojadas: materia prima para la expansion del
capital norteamericano," Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios Socio-
logicos (El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico, D.F.), No. 9 (1975); and
North and Houstoun, "Illegal Aliens." The North and Houstoun study
is based on interviews with apprehended aliens who had worked for at
least two weeks in the U.S. and is therefore less subject to the type
of systematic sampling bias discussed below than other studies which
have sampled the "apprehended" population without regard to length
of stay or employment in the U.S. It is interesting to note that
there is much greater correspondence between our findings on migrant
remittances and those of the North-Houstoun study, as compared
with the studies by Bustamante and the Mexican government's Comision
Intersecretarial.
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The studies just cited are based exclusively or primarily on
interviews with illegal Mexican migrants who have been arrested and
deported by U.S. authorities, the interviews being conducted either in
INS detention centers or other U.S. government offices, or in Mexican
government offices immediately following deportation. Our research deals
with the total migration flow from the communities under study: legal
and illegal migrants to the U.S. (as well as to localities within Mexico),
"illegals" who have been arrested and deported as well as those who have
not been apprehended while in the U.S. As noted above, the majority of
our informants who have migrated illegally to the U.S. fall into this
latter category.
INS records clearly show that most Mexican illegals who are
arrested and deported (a distinct minority of the total flow) are
apprehended within 72 hours of crossing the border--usually an insufficient
amount of time in which to secure stable employment and remit earnings to
Mexico. Therefore, research findings on job-seeking success and cash
remittances which are based on interviews with this sector of the migrant
population may suffer from a major, systematic, "downward" bias. Illegal
entry into the U.S. is, of course, a learning experience; and our inter-
views indicate that the probability of arrest and deportation declines
with each successive entry. Thus those who are apprehended tend to be
"first-timers," considerably younger and less experienced than those who
escape detection. Moreover, for many of the migrants, arrest and depor-
tation do not constitute the ultimate outcome ("failure") of their
migratory experience, since re-entry is often attempted within a day or so
of deportation, and is likely to be successful.
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Another possible source of bias in research based on interviews
with apprehended illegals, and which may help to explain the apparently
contradictory findings mentioned above, relates to the reactivity of the
interview situation. When migrants are interviewed in detention centers
or other government offices, they may choose to underreport success in
job seeking and the amount of cash remittances to their families in
Mexico, fearing official sanctions either against themselves or against
fellow "illegals" in their place of U.S. employment. We believe that more
accurate data on employment and remittances may be gathered through
interviews with returned migrants conducted in the privacy of their homes
in their communities of origin. We are also aware of the possibility that
the returned migrant may choose to exaggerate his success in the U.S.,
either to impress the interviewer or to maintain his self-esteem in the
face of an unsuccessful experience in the U.S. However, we have not
relied exclusively on self-reported information in reaching our conclusions
regarding the economic impact of migration to the U.S. on the families and
communities represented in our study. All the objective indicators of
"success"--quality of housing construction, variety of durable consumer
goods in the home, amount of land, livestock, and farm machinery possessed,
number of children maintained in schools, etc.--strongly suggest that
temporary migrants to the U.S. have achieved a standard of living higher
than that of the average non-elite resident of their communities. This
is especially true of migrants who have secured legal entry papers or
resident status in the U.S. (usually after one or more illegal entries);
but it is also true of those who have continued to migrate illegally. The
peasant's perceptions of abundant economic opportunities in the U.S. may
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result partly from the "success stories" told by returning migrants; but
the material basis for many such tales cannot be denied, and is quite
visible to young men newly entering the labor force.
Given the clandestine nature of most Mexican migration to the
United States and the vast and geographically dispersed population
involved, a statistically representative, random sample of this population
is virtually impossible to obtain. It is, in short, extremely difficult
to define the relevant "universe" of people and sample it with any degree
of precision. Our own "case study" does not attempt this, and studies
based on interviews with apprehended illegnls do not achieve it. Each of
the major studies completed or undertaken to date has dealt with a segment
of the relevant population--different parts of the same elephant. Obviously,
a variety of studies using different designs and methodologies are necessary
to illuminate the larger phenomenon with which we are concerned, and to
provide a basis for intelligent and humane policy decisions affecting it.
We believe that rigorous, comparative research focusing on the phenomenon
from the perspective of the Mexican camlesino and his community--however
limited in geographic scope--may make an important contribution to public
discussion and policy formulation in this area.
